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[The following article is reproduced with permission of the Washington-based Council on
Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). It was published in the Aug. 20, 1993 edition of COHA's biweekly
publication, "Washington Report on the Hemisphere."] Aug. 1 brought Brazilians a new currency,
the Cruzeiro Real, with three zeros less than its predecessor, the Cruzeiro. The fourth issue of
new monetary units since 1986, which cumulatively have managed to eliminate nine extraneous
zeros, it resembles previous monetary reforms in their effort to bring inflation under control. The
measure changed the minimum monthly salary from 5.2 million Cruzeiros to 5,200 Cruzeiros Reales,
or approximately US$72, but it is particularly unique in that it is not accompanied by price and
wage freezes. Previously, a currency change was portrayed as the beginning of a new phase in the
country's economic life, since inflation would supposedly be eradicated through freezing prices
and limiting credit. The decree instituting the Cruzeiro Real, however, was more an administrative
measure aimed at simplifying accounting procedures. It was also the first manifestation of Brazil's
latest effort to promote economic recovery, initiated by the new Finance Minister, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso. Cardoso, a renowned economist and a respected senator, has been called
"the best choice for the worst job in the country" by businessmen and politicians. When sworn
in last May, Cardoso announced that inflation would be curbed through government spending
cuts over the next year and a half. His strategy, the Truth Plan, is based on the assumption that
the Brazilian economy, with its high productivity and trade capacities, is ready to expand its role
in the international economy. According to the new minister, an inflation- generated government
deficit, which can only be reduced through austere controls on public spending, stands in the
way of economic growth. [Editor's note: Consumer prices increased at an average rate of 25% per
month last year, with annual inflation for 1992 officially estimated at 1,150%. This year, inflation has
edged up to an average monthly rate of 32%.] The Cardoso plan has four central elements: a US$6
billion budget cut, tight control over state banks through prohibiting loans to local governments,
acceleration of privatization with the exception of the most profitable enterprises, and a program
to fight tax evasion, which has been estimated to run as high as 50%. The finance minister also
intends to increase federal revenue through a 2.5% tax on checks. Yet the elimination of inflation
is not President Itamar Franco's only objective. The government ultimately wants to alleviate the
misery suffered by the rapidly expanding Brazilian underclass, demonstrated by urban slums
swollen with dispossessed rural immigrants, a 13% malnutrition rate among children five years and
younger, and the hundreds of thousands of children born or abandoned to violent urban streets. But
the widespread misery, undeniably worsened by inflation, cannot be ameliorated solely by fiscal
austerity programs. Since 1986, Brazil has had five economic "shocks" monetary control plans which
were miraculously supposed to decrease inflation all of which failed because its inflation is inertial,
resisting isolated monetary measures. The federal, state, and municipal governments ran up huge
deficits knowing the state banking system would provide the needed capital. The private sector,
aware of this cozy arrangement, has always been prepared to increase its prices in anticipation
of future inflation. The inflated prices would then be passed on to consumers whose wages only
partially have been corrected for past inflation. With decreasing purchasing power, workers
press their employers for higher salaries. Even though the Truth Plan targets the core of inflation,
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its success will mainly benefit the middle class, while the lives of more than 25% of Brazilians
living under the poverty line are not likely to be improved by Cardoso's measures. Poverty in
Brazil, as in most Latin American countries, is the consequence of deep structural injustice. Since
colonization, these societies have been dominated by a small elite which has controlled most of
the nation's cash output and has striven to keep labor cheap. Recently, hemispheric nations have
been forced to join the global capitalist economy, implementing Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPs), a product of the neoliberal economic model that, through the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank, inspired the economic "shocks" in the first place. SAPs provide the
international banking community's latest recipe for economic growth. They are prerequisites for
improving living standards, to be brought about by decreased state intervention in the economy
along with privatization, tariff reductions, cuts in federal spending through slashed state payrolls,
and currency devaluation to attract foreign investment. While Brazil's restructuring effort closely
follows the usual prescriptions for economic growth and development, it all but ignores internal
socio-economic structural deficiencies, such as highly inequitable income distribution (in 1990 the
lower 30% of the Brazilian population received 2.2% of the national income, while the upper 10%
accounted for 48.7%). Critics of SAPs claim that when neoliberal policies are applied to existing
unjust structures, they may generate high growth rates Brazil in the 1970's reached rates of 10% but
they increase poverty as well. For example, unemployment mounts because subsistence agriculture
and manufacturing give way to mechanized production which eliminates jobs. Meanwhile, reduced
social spending hinders access to education, public health, and housing. Cardoso might be right in
his prediction of economic growth once inflation is controlled, in which case the rich and middle
class sectors would immediately benefit. If the objective is also to alleviate the hardships and misery
of the Brazilian poor, socio-economic reforms must alter the concentration of wealth among a small
elite. While many agree that the road to economic recovery and social improvement will be painful
and slow, Brazilian dissidents passionately argue that the Truth Plan must include a commitment
to reducing inequality now, instead of waiting for some illusory future moment when the fruits of
economic growth will allow urgently needed redistribution to take place.
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